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Abstract
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) pointed out that patents may be inferior to other forms of
intellectual property in that the independent invention is not a defence to infringement. The
authors’ analysis refers to situations in which there is an unlimited number of potential
entrants by independent duplication. If independent invention were a defence to
infringement, the continual threat of entry would induce the patent−holder to license its
technology on terms that commit to a lower output price, and this is where the social benefit
lies. In this note we extend the analysis to the case of a single potential entrant when the law
impose certain restrictions on the contracts that patent holders and licensees can subscribe.
We show that these legal restrictions may be partial substitutes for the continual threat of
entry by as yet unidentified subjects.
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Maurer and Scotchmer (M-S, 2002) recently argued that patents can be inferior to other 
forms of intellectual property in which independent invention either is a recognised de-
fence to infringement (e.g. trade secrets) or is not protected against in the first place 
(e.g. copyright). In the M-S model a patent-holder has a proprietary product that can be 
independently duplicated at a given cost by as yet unidentified entrants. If independent 
invention were a defence to infringement, the threat of entry by duplication would in-
duce the patent-holder to license its technology, lowering the market price. On the other 
hand, the threat of independent invention would curb market power without threatening 
the patent-holder’s ability to cover his R&D costs, at least when duplication costs are 
not too low. According to M-S, it is the threat of duplication by unlimited potential en-
trants that renders the independent invention defence socially desirable. If the number of 
potential entrants were fixed, the optimal licensing strategy would be to sustain the mo-
nopoly price with high royalties, and to share the revenues by using other fees (see also 
Gallini and Scotchmer, 2001). In this case the independent invention defence would be 
ineffectual. 
The aim of this note is to show that the independent innovation defence might bear 
social benefits even with a limited number of potential entrants, provided the law re-
stricts the contracts that patent-holder and licensees can subscribe. In other words, we 
claim that the legal prohibition of certain transfers among firms, coupled with the ca-
pacity of detection, may work as a partial substitute for the continual threat of entry by 
unidentified subjects. The model we discuss assumes a single potential entrant and 
Cournot competition. We will show that when the patent-holder is restricted from mak-
ing lump-sum payments to the licensee, licensing doesn’t bear a monopolistic solution, 
and, more important, in any situations there exist royalty contracts avoiding entry by 
duplication. As regards the patent-holder’s incentive to innovate, we will stress two ex-
treme cases. If the bargaining power of the patent-holder and the potential entrant are 
similar, the incentive to innovate is preserved when the costs of duplication are more or 
less commensurate with the original innovator’s costs. But when the patent-holder has 
full bargaining power, it is enough that the costs of duplication are not less than half the 
inventor’s costs, as in the M-S model. We will analyse the welfare effects as well. The 
effect on ex-post social welfare of the independent invention defence always turns out 
positive, in spite of the difference in marginal costs of production of the two firms due 
to royalty licensing. 
 
 
2  Licensing versus duplication in a Cournot duopoly 
 
Following M-S, we assume that a firm, having invested 
P K  in R&D, has a proprietary 
product that can independently be duplicated at the cost 
E K . In our case, though, the 
number of potential entrants is not unlimited, but restricted to one firm, which can enter 
the market through licensing or duplication. The removal of non-identified firms enter-
ing the market arises the possibility of collusive agreements between the incumbent and 
  1the entrant to share monopolistic profits. The patent-holder might, for instance, use the 
licensing contract to exchange monopoly rights for a fixed fee paid by his rival, or the 
two firms might sign a licensing contract implying a high royalty and a negative fixed 
fee. Following Gallini and Winter (1985), we not only assume that the assignment of 
monopoly rights or negative payments are illegal, but also that contracts implying non-
linear royalties are not institutionally admitted.
1,2 As we will see, under these legal re-
strictions the independent invention defence implies that the monopolistic solution is 
not possible, at least when duplication costs are not too high.  
The entrant may then enter the market through licensing paying a royalty per unit 
output equal to  0 ≥ ρ , and a fixed fee  , or spending  0 ≥ F
E K  to duplicate the product. 
In the following subsection we take ρ  and   as exogenous and then we characterize 
equilibrium in the game in which (i) the entrant first decides whether to duplicate or 
enter through licensing, and then (ii) the entrant and patent holder engage in Cournot 
competition in the ouput market. Given the equilibrium payoffs of each player for fixed 
F
ρ  and  , the royalty rate and fee will be endogenized in Subsection 2.2 by supposing 
that they are determined by Nash bargaining. In other words, our solution concept is 
subgame perfect equilibrium: we first identify some characteristics of the SPE of the 
game described above, and then we characterize the Nash bargaining solutions to the 
bargaining problem in which payoffs are the SPE payoffs associated with each (
F
) ,F ρ  
pair. 
 
2.1  Cournot equilibrium 
 
In the case of entry by duplication, the patent-holder and the entrant face the same mar-
ginal cost of production, say  . Then, if  c q a p − = ,  , is the inverse demand 
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where  ,  , and   indicate the patent-holder’s profit, the entrant’s profit, and the 
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If, otherwise, the two firms sign a licensing contract, the marginal costs of the 
entrant will be  ρ + c . We have to distinguish two situations: 
2
c a −
< ρ  and 
2
c a −
≥ ρ . 
                                                           
1 Exclusive licensing  with lump sum fees is legal in many countries. What we mean is that such licenses 
should be legally prohibited, on the grounds given in our subsequent analysis. In synthesis, if the 
monopoly cannot be maintained through an exclusive license or through side payments (negative fixed 
fees), the independent invention defence would guarantee an output price lower than monopoly price. 
2 Erutktu and Richelle (2001) studied the role of non-linear royalty schemes in a Cournot duopoly model 
when a new product is introduced. However, in this model there is no independent invention defence and 
the licensor is an outsider innovator. 





, the patent-holder’s profit,  , the licensee’s profit, Π , and the output 
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, the licensee’s marginal costs of production are not smaller than  , so 
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where  ,  , and   indicate the patent-holder’s monopoly profit, the potential 
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Proposition 1 Let’s assume that the independent invention is a defence to infringement 
and that Π , so that  0 > −
E E
D K




. Then, if the only legally admissible li-
censing contracts are royalty contracts with uniform rate and non negative fixed fee: (i) 
the product price will be lower than the monopoly price and (ii) entry will occur 
through licensing. 
 





M D p <
. Then, as   and  , it follows that 
. So, entrant will enter the market by duplication. The product 
price will then be  . When 








L − Π < − Π 0
p
a
< ρ , we have  . Then the product price 
will be  , if licensing is the best option for the entrant, or  , if duplica-
tion is. As to point (ii), in order to verify that the set of feasible licensing contracts (as 




M L p < M p
) ,F ρ  with 
0 = ρ  and  . This contract, though individually suboptimal (see Proposition 
2 below), implies that inequalities Π  and Π  hold. 










2.2 Nash bargaining 
 
We have so far seen that when the costs of duplication are sufficiently low to make the 
entry threat effective and when negative fixed fees are ruled out, the monopolistic out-
come is not a solution and entry will occur through licensing. The issue we are now in-
terested in is to investigate the conditions under which the independent invention de-
  3fence preserves the patent-holder’s incentive to innovate. The first step requires estab-
lishing how the patent-holder and the licensee share the rents stemming from the li-
censing contract. A first possibility is to suppose that the contract  ) , ( F ρ  is determined 
through a Nash bargaining process where the two players have given bargaining pow-
ers, not necessarily identical. Let  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α  be the bargaining power of the patent-holder. 
Then, the problem is 
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is the licensee’s output. 
 









. Then, if negative fixed fees are ruled out, the patent-holder and the 
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Proof Using equations (1), (2) and (5) we can verify that there exists a unique point 
where the derivatives V  and   are simultaneously zero. Such point corresponds to  ρ F V
2
c a −
= ρ  and 
36

















 and  1 < α , at this 
point  . Let’s then put  0 < F 0 = F . There exist three points where V   and 
, that is 
0 = | 0 = F ρ



















. For  1 ρ ρ = , we have V , whereas  0 0> | ρρ = F
3 ρ ρ =  is not an acceptable solution because there  . The last possibility is the  0 <
E
L q
  4point * ρ  in which  0 0 < = F ρρ V ,  0 0 < = F F V , and the constraints to (4) are satisfied. In 
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Proposition 2 extends the result obtained by Wang (1998; see also Kamien and 
Tauman, 2002) for a Cournot duopoly with a cost reducing innovation and patent-
holder’s full bargaining power to the case of product innovation with duplication possi-
bility and Nash bargaining. In our case too, royalty works as a device to maintain high 
rents, though lower than the ones obtained in the monopolistic outcome. 
 
2.3 The incentive to innovate 
 
Once determined the rent sharing, we can verify whether the portion going to the patent-
holder is enough to maintain the incentive to innovate. To this purpose, we assume that 
the incentive to innovate is preserved when the patent-holder not only covers innovation 
costs  , but also obtains net revenues not smaller than those of the entrant. In such 
situation a waiting strategy in the hope that the rival makes first the innovation, in order 
to take advantage from the independent invention defence, is not convenient. We then 
have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 Let’s suppose that the independent invention is a defence to infringement 
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Proof Let’s put Π , and using equations (1) and (5) let’s solve for 
E
L
P Π = + ρ
ρ . We obtain 
2
4 ) (
P 2 K c a − −
= ρ . Using then equation (6) it is easy to 
see that for 
α 9
P K
 we have  ρ ρ ≥ * .  A s  Π  and Π  are respectively 




L q ρ +
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L
, it follows that for  * ρ ρ =  and 
α 9
4







Proposition 3 says that if the patent-holder and the licensee have the same bargain-
ing power (  ½), the innovation incentive is preserved if the cost of duplication,
E K , 
is at least as large as the inventor’s cost, 
P K . If, however, the patent-holder has a 
contractual advantage over the licensee, the condition is less stringent. In fact, for α  
close to 1, that is to say when the patent-holder can propose the contract to the licensee 
as a take-or-leave-it offer, then duplicator’s costs can be as little as half those of the 
                                                           
3 A detailed proof is disposable upon request. 
  5patent-holder, exactly as in the case of unlimited potential entrants analysed by M-S 
(see their Proposition 1). 
 
2.4 Social welfare 
 
As we have seen (Proposition 1), consumers benefit from the defence of independent 
innovation as product price is then lower than the monopolistic level. But what is the ef-
fect on ex-post social welfare? It is well known that, in absence of licensing, the entry of 
a firm competing à la Cournot with an incumbent reduces welfare if entrant’s marginal 
costs of production are sufficiently high as compared with incumbent’s cost (Klemperer, 
1988; Lahiri and Ono, 1988). Nevertheless, in the case of royalty licensing the distortion 
caused by the differential in marginal costs of production doesn’t automatically means a 
deadweight loss, because the higher cost for the licensee means a higher revenue for the 
licensor. Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2003) have shown that in a model in which the en-
trant may enter a market at zero duplication fixed costs, but incurring in marginal costs 
higher than the incumbent’s ones, the appropriation of the cost difference through the 
payment of royalties guarantees that entry always bears a positive effect on ex-post wel-
fare. This result is maintained in our case. 
 









. Then, if the entrant enters the market by a licensing contract 
) 0 *, (ρ , entry always bears positive effects on ex-post welfare. 
 













+ Π + + Π = ρ . From equations (1) and (5) it results that for 
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+ Π = = W , where W  is ex-post welfare under 
monopoly. As W  is decreasing in 
M




< ρ , it follows that for  * ρ ρ =  





We studied the effects of independent invention defence when there is a single potential 
entrant in a market initially monopolised by a patent-holder who has a proprietary prod-
uct, under the assumption of Cournot competition, linear market demand and constant 
returns. As long as law restricts licensing contracts ruling out the possibility to set 
negative fixed fees, the independent invention defence reduces the output price, without 
necessarily threatening the incentive to innovate. In fact, if the cost of duplication is not 
too low, the reduction of the product price simply means a reduction of the over-re-
  6warding of the patent-holder, which takes place in the patent system when the value of 
the invention is high relative to its invention cost. Moreover, although the marginal 
costs of production of the two firms are different because of royalty licensing, social 
welfare is improved. These results are in line with those obtained by M-S in the case of 
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